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Increased  use  of  marketing  contracts  by  agri-  tomato  purchase  contracts  are:  (a) a  specifically
cultural  firms  has  stimulated  a  modest  amount  of  defined  market  price,  (b) seller's  variable  production
literature  in  which  the  principles  of decision  theory  cost  times  a  markup  ("cost-plus")  and  (c)  buyer's
are  applied  to  the contracting  problem.  Much  of this  revenue  from  resale  times  a  markdown  ("sales-
literature  has  focused  on  farmers'  choices  between  minus").
cash  and  futures  market  positions  [7].  Others  have  Under  market  price  contracts  both  buyer  and
modeled  the  influence  of  annual  open  market  and  seller  may  avoid  opportunity  losses;  that  is,  short
fixed  forward  price  options  on  farm  growth  objec-  term  situations  in which  the open market offers more
tives  [1,  3].  Little  or no attention  has been  paid  to  advantageous  terms  than does the contract.  However,
expressed  interest,  especially  among  processors,  for  if  long-term  contracting  or  vertical  integration  is
suitable  long-term  (multi-annual)  contract  price  widespread  in  an  industry,  market  prices reflect such
formulae  and  for  a  theoretical  framework  through  a  thin  proportion  of  trade  that  little opportunity  is
which  to  evaluate  them.  This  paper  attempts  to  permitted  for  additional  trade  at  those  prices.
provide  this  service  in  special  regard  to  the  tomato  Besides,  market  prices  are  often  highly  volatile,  a
and  tomato paste  contracting  problems of a U.S.  fruit  drawback  for security conscious business firms.
and vegetable  processing cooperative.  Cost-plus  prices  are  advantageous  to  sellers
because  they guarantee  sellers  a fixed or fixed rate  of
gross  margin.  Variable  costs  of  farm  production  are
ALTERNATIVE  PRICING ARRANGEMENTS  usually  more  stable  than  market  prices  of  farm
The  modeled  cooperative  processor  has  com-  output,  so that cost-plus  prices  for farm products are
mitted  a  specific  tonnage  of  bulk  tomato  paste  for  more predictable  than associated  market prices.
ten-year contract sale  to a distributor who reprocesses  Sales-minus  prices  constitute  a  seller's  share  of
the  paste  into  tomato  sauce.  In the  model  variation  buyer's resale  revenue;  buyers  are guaranteed  a  fixed
considered  here,  25  percent  of  anticipated  raw  or  fixed  rate  of  gross  return  over  the  sales-minus
tomatoes  needed  to  service  the  paste  contract  is  priced  input.  Behavior  of sales-minus  prices  depends
expected  to  be  purchased  from non-member growers.  on  prevailing  market  conditions  for  the  resold  good
Non-member  tomato purchase  contracts are  presently  and buyer's sales  strategies  and  aggressiveness  relative
signed  by  the  acre  on  an  annual  basis,  but  the  to that good.  At present,  little long  term contracting
cooperative  wishes  to consider ten-year contracts  that  is encountered  in  U.S.  paste markets.The majority of
would,  apart  from  yield  fluctuations,  secure  the  paste  is  sold  at  spot  market  prices,  but  cost-plus
integrity  of the  ten-year  paste  contract.'  Alternative  contracts  are  beginning  to attract  interest.  Some raw
price  formulae  designed  for  both  paste  sale  and  tomatoes  are  sold on  three  to  five  year market  price
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1Contract alternatives were not considered  for member growers  since it is assumed  all members receive a share of cooperative
net operating margin.
17contracts,  and  processing  cooperatives  often purchase  price  formulae,  (d) substitute these moments  into the
vegetables  on sales-minus agreements  called  secondary  mean  and  variance formulae  and minimize  net margin
pools.  Long  term  contracts  employing  variants of the  variance  at selected mean values.
above  formulae  will  likely  expand in both  paste  and
tomato  markets in the future.  Net Margin  Function
The  cooperative's  net  margin  function,  which
MODEL CONSTRUCTION  does  not include  a valuation  of raw product delivered
from  member  growers,  is provided  in  Table  1.  Lines
Portfolio  Efficiency Criteria 1,  10  and  12  contain  revenue  and  costs  of  non-
Work  by  Markowitz  [5]  and  others  has demon-  tomato-paste  activities;  lines  2-5,  formulae  defining
strated  that  a portfolio  of contract  options  possesses  operation  of  market  price,  cost-plus  and  sales-minus
greater  advantages  for  risk  averting  firms  than  does  prices  as  they  apply  to tomato  paste  contract  sales;
reliance  on  any  single  option,  provided  expected  lines  6-8,  formulae defining these prices  as they apply
returns  of  each  option  are  sufficiently  close.  In  the  to  nonmember  tomato purchases;  and lines 9 and  11,
absence  of  quantitative  measures  of  firm  money  other  variable  and  fixed  costs  of  contract  tomato
utility,  research  work  is  reduced  to  identifying  paste  operations.
"efficient"  portfolios.  The  most  general  method  of  A  contract  to  trade a  specified  tonnage of goods
isolating  contract  portfolios  that  would  never  be  is  expected  to  have  a  different  impact  on  profit
employed  by  a  risk  averse,  expected  utility  maxi-  variability  than a  contract  to trade random output of
mizing  firm  is  to  compare  cumulative  distribution  a  specified  number  of acres.  Both  can  be modeled  in
functions  of earnings  under  each  portfolio  and reject  Table  1.  Note  that  the  basis  of all  dollar calculations
those  functions  whose  underlying  areas  are  greater  for  paste  sales  and  tomato  purchases  is  to  multiply
than  the  minimum  area  (second  degree  stochastic  acres  of tomatoes  by a  price  or cost  variable  per  ton
dominance).  If probabilities of each contract price are  raw  product  and  by tomato yields per acre.  If tomato
approximately  normally  distributed,  or  if  the  paste  is  sold  by  the  ton,  sales  receipts  do  not
modeled  firm  has  approximately  quadratic  money  fluctuate  with tomato yields;  these  yields are usually
utility  within  a  specified  range  of wealth,  considera-  represented  by  an average  yield,  which  is  a constant.
tion  of  moments  higher  than  the  variance  is  un-  If  paste  is  sold  by  its  equivalent  raw  product
necessary  and  the  more  familiar  E-V  analysis2 pro-  acre-yield,  sales receipts  vary randomly both  with per
duces  results  identical  to  stochastic  dominance  tests  ton price  and with per acre tomato yields; in this case
[4].  It  was  unnecessary  to  invoke  the  theoretically  yields  are  represented  by  a  random  variable.  It  is
troublesome  quadratic  utility  since,  as  shown  below,  usual  for  raw  tomatoes  to  be  purchased  on  an
the  normality  assumption  was  found  acceptable  in  acre-yield  basis.  Where  paste  is  sold  on  forward
the  present  circumstance.  E-V  analysis  was  then  contract  per  ton,  the  cooperative  may  contract  the
selected  over stochastic  dominance  on the basis of its  number  of  tomato  acres  required  under  expected
substantially  greater programming  ease.  yields  to  produce  this  tonnage.  Deviations  from
Paste  and  tomato  contracting  problems  were  expected  yields  are  thus  a source  of cooperative  net
separately  studied  from  the  point  of  view  of  non-  margin variability.4
member  grower,  cooperative  and  distributor/  Cooperative  revenue  in the sales-minus  purchase
reprocessor.  In  each  case,  alternative  portfolios  were  option  may  include  revenues  from  all  processing
evaluated  by E-V analysis  and by parametric expected  activities  or  those  from  paste  contract  sales  only.  In
utility  maximizations  [2].  Only  E-V  results and only  either  event, contracting  growers'  crop payments  are
the  cooperative's  case  are reported  here.  To cast  the  affected  by  the  contract  portfolio  the  cooperative
contracting  problem  in  an  E-V  framework  it  was  adopts  for  its  paste  sales.  This  presents  modeling
necessary  to:  (a)  specify  the  cooperative's  net margin  problems.  If,  for  example,  in  a  sales-minus  purchase
function3 including  all  pricing  options,  (b) develop  contract  the  cooperative  wishes  to  pay  growers  a
mean  and  variance  formulae  for net margins,  (c)  esti-  share  of  its  paste  sale  revenue  earned  under  the
mate  means,  variances  and  covariances  of alternative  optimal  paste  sale  portfolio,  lines  2-5  must  be
2 E-V  analysis  refers  to identification  of that set  of  strategies which provide minimum variance  of  return for selected  fixed
expected returns.
3Cooperative  and non-cooperative  business firms often consider other objectives than net margin. However,  such alternatives
are not molded in the present study.
4Processors  forward contracting  all product  sales  on a tonnage basis  and  purchasing raw  product  on an acreage basis must
keep an inventory sufficient to carry "normal"  pack shortfalls and in which to place "normal"  pack excess. An alternative to such
inventories,  which  may  carry  high  maintenance  costs,  is  to  per-ton  contract  a  sufficiently  small  portion  of  sales  that  pack
shortfalls can be compensated  by diversion from  non-contract  to contract sales.
18TABLE  1.  COOPERATIVE  NET  MARGIN  FUNC-  substituted  for cooperative  revenue  (REVC)  in line  8.
TION  Since  lines  2-5 are linear in  V and line 8 (with REVC)
Line  - is also  linear  in  V,  the  transformed  expression in line
number  Formula  Meaning  8  would  be  quadratic  in  V.  The  net margin  function
1  +REVCnpst  nonpaste  revenue  would  become  quadratic  and  net  margin  variance
2  +V(AAC)(l/)(Mpt  a  market  pricquartic,  so  that  E-V  optimizations  would  -become
2  +V (AAC)(l/x)(MP  )  market  price  paste
1  pst  tom  revenue  exceedingly  complex.  To  preserve  a linear net margin
3  +V (AAC)(m)(Mpot *  )  acost-plus  paste  function  and  hence  quadratic E-V objective  function,
2  +V2(A  ~tom  tom  revenue
t  revenue  it  is  necessary  in  the  sales-minus  purchase  option  to
(AAC)()(/x)(NT  to  revenue  employ  a  paste  sales portfolio that  is not a  function
5  +V3(AAC)(n)(/xy)(MPte  Y a of V  and  hence  that is not necessarily optimal.  In the
+V 3 (AAC)(n)(l/sY)(M~ce  tom)  sales-minus paste
revenue  present  case  it was  assumed  for this purpose  that  all
6  -R 1(AAC)(MPtom  tom)  market  price  paste  is  sold  under  market  price  contract  and  none
7  -R 2 (AAC)(k  to  a  tomato  cost
7  -R 2 (AAC)(k)(VCFa  )  cost-plus  under cost-plus or sales-minus.
tom  tomato  cost




*a)  nontomato  variable  All  price,  revenue  and  variable  cost  terms  in
pst  tm  cost  of  paste  Table  1  are  random  variables  and  remaining  terms,
production
10  _VCC  variable  cost  of  except  the  V,  R  decision variables,  are parametrically
npst  nonpaste  production  alterable  constants.  Once  means,  variances  and
11  -FCC  st  fixed  cost  of  paste  covariances  of the  random  variables are known, mean
pst  production
~12  -FCC  fixed  cost  of  ~  and  variance  of  net  margin  can  be  determined  from
npst  nonpaste  production  formulae  expressing moments  of a linear combination
Term  Definition  of  random  variables.  One  may  then  measure  the
V 1 ,V2 , V3 Nonrandom  variables  (proportions)  by  effect  on  total  mean  and  variance  of  programmed
which  the  cooperative  chooses  a  port-  changes  in  sales  and  purchase  portfolio  proportions
folio of sales contract  options. 
V,  R. R1, R2 , R 3 Nonrandom  variables  (proportions)  by
which  the  cooperative  chooses  a  port-
folio of purchase  contract  options.  Estimates of Probability Moments
AAC  The  acreage  which,  at  expected  yields
per  acre,  the  cooperative  calculates  will  An importantproblemencounteredin  estimating
be  required  to  just  meet  target  tomato  probability  moments  of  individual  variables  is  that
paste production.  these  moments  should  represent  not  historical  but
ma  Tomato yields in tons per acre.
Mtom  t  Per  ton  market  prices  of:  processing  prediction  probabilities  for  the  ten-year  planning MPt  MPt  Per  ton  market  prices  of:  processing
Mtom'  pst  tomatoes  at  farmgate,  tomato  paste  at  horizon.  Sources of future uncertainty  arise from  two
Mt  paste  plant,  and  tomato  sauce  at  sauce
Mtsce  paste rplctiy  sources:  uncertainty  over which  trend line  a  random see  plant respectively.
VCFom  Variable  (cash)  costs  to produce  an acre  variable  will  follow,  and  uncertainty  caused  by
of  processing  tomatoes,  Central  Valley,  random  movements  expected  to occur  about which-
California.
NTVCCt  Nontomato  variable  (cash)  costs to  pro-  ever  trend  develops.  Because  random  prices and costs
pst  duce  a ton  of bulk tomato  paste, includ-  are  encountered  by  the  firm  in  each  year  of  the
ingtats  tomato  transport  to cannery. ing tomato transport to cannery,  planning  horizon, and the long-term  contract decision
REVCns  Revenue  earned  by the cooperative in  its
npst  nonpaste  processing  operations.  has  to  be  made  in  the  first  year,  the  appropriate
REVC  Revenue  earned  by the cooperative  from  variable  measure  is a present value sum of anticipated
processing operations.
VCCnpst  Variable  (cash)  costs  allocated  by  the  simulation  model  of  a  random  variable  X  in  year  t,
cooperative  to  its  nonpaste  processing  representing  any  random  variable  listed  in  Table  1
operations.
FCCnt  FCC  t  Fixed  costs allocated  by the cooperative  footnotes, was constructed  of the form:
to  its  nonpaste  and  paste  processing
operations respectively.  X  (K  + Bt + Et)/(  +  i)t  (1)
m  >  Markup for cost-plus paste  sales. 
k>1  Markup  for  cost-plus  tomato purchases.
o <n  <  1  Markdown for sales-minus paste sales.  where
o  <  <  1  Markdown  for  sales-minus  tomato  pur-
chases.  K =  variable's  current value
Tons  of  tomato  paste  required  to  pro-
duce one ton of tomato  sauce.  B  =  annual trend
x  Tons  of processing  tomatoes  required  to  E =  error about trend,  and
produce one ton of tomato paste.
i =  discount  rateBoth  B  and  Et  are  random.  Distributions  B  are,  in  remains  positive  but  is  remarkably  flat.  The  cor-
this  study,  estimated  from  the  firm's  subjective  responding  coefficient  of  variation  curve  behaves
probabilities  assigned  to  alternative  future  trends.  similarly.  Since  additional  net  margin  expectation  is
Distributions  Et  are  estimated  from  historical  values  purchased  with  very  low  increments  of  risk,  only
about the  historical  trend,  under the assumption that  highly  risk  averse  decision  makers  would  avoid  the
variance  around  whatever  future  trend  develops  is at  profit  maximum  strategy.  This  strategy  calls  for
least  approximated  by  variance  around  the  historical  market  price  paste  sales  and  cost-plus  tomato  pur-
trend.  From  simulated  values  of  Xt,  mean  and  chases.  Exceedingly  risk  averting  coops would  ignore
variance  are  calculated  for  each  year  t  and  these  the  market  price  sales  option  and  evenly  divide  sales
summed  to  provide  prediction  probability  moments  between  cost-plus  and  sales-minus;  their  purchases
appropriate  for  a  long-term  decision.  Prediction  would mostly be made at market prices.
covariances  are  estimated  by  combining  prediction  In  frontier  set #2, the  impact of a slightly higher
standard  deviations  with  correlation  coefficients  cost-plus  sales markup  m  and lower sales-minus  sales
computed  from  historical  series,  where  these  series  markdown  n  is  dramatic.  The  range  of  net  margin
are adjusted to induce expected  future  trend.  choices  increases  600  percent  and  both  curves
An  advantage  of  the  simulation  model  is  that  develop  bowl  shapes.  Cost-plus  replaces  market  price
random  values  are  generated  from  which  chi-square  as  the  high  mean  profit  sales  option.  Interesting
tests  of  alternative  distribution  forms  can  be  changes  are  also  noted  in  the  tomato  purchase
designed.  In  the  present  case,  it  was  assumed  that  portfolios,  where  market  price  increases  its propor-
trend  errors  Et are  normally  distributed  with  zero  tions  in  the  mid-mean  range  at  the  expense  of
means.  Subjective  trend probabilities  B  were  discrete  cost-plus.  Because  no  changes  were  made in purchase
and  did  not  conform  to  theoretical  distributions;  side  parameters,  this  effect  must  be  due  to  co-
some  were  moderately  asymmetric.  However  the  variances  between  revenue  and  cost  terms  in  the  net
hypothesis  that  resultant  combined  variables  Xt are  margin  function.  Specifically,  65  percent  of tomato
normally  distributed was rejected only  in the  instance  paste  production  costs  are accounted  for by  tomato
of grower variable  costs (VCFOm ).  market  price,  so  that  sales  side  cost-plus  option  V2
and  purchase  side  market  price  option R1 are related
Efficient  Portfolio Solution by  a negative  sign in the net margin  function. Thus as
The  completely  specified  E-V  model  is  not  cost-plus sales increase in portfolio importance  due to
reported  here  due  to  the  lengthy  set  of  covariance  a  rise  in  the  cost-plus  markup,  risk  averters  are
data  involved  in  the  variance  expression.  Seven  motivated  to  increase  the  proportion  of market price
cooperative  E-V  curves were estimated  by a quadratic  tomato  purchases  as  well.  Presence  of  covariances
programming  routine,  each  representing  a  different  means that  sales and  purchase  contract portfolios are
set  of assumptions regarding  cost-plus markups m and  interdependent.
k  and  sales-minus  markdowns  n  and  1 s :  tonnage  or  Efficiency  set  #3  is  included  to  demonstrate
acreage  basis  paste  sales;  revenue  bases  for  the  what  happens  when  a  firm  restricts  its  own  access
sales-minus  tomato  purchase  contracts;  optimism  of  to  alternative  price  formulae.  In  this  case,  to  guard
price  forecasts;  and  use  restrictions  on  selected  against  market  opportunity  losses,  market  price
contract  formulae.  Three  of these  curves  are listed in  paste  sales  may  not  fall  below  60  percent  of  total
Table  2  and  graphed  in  Figures  1  through  3.  Solid  contract  sales.  Since  market  price  sales  are  the
lines  indicate  efficient  mean,  variance  tradeoffs  and  high  risk  option,  this  constraint  removes  the  lower
dotted  lines  indicate  mean,  coefficient  of  variation  portion  of  the  E-V  curve.  The  remaining  portion  is
tradeoffs. 6 Assumptions  under  which  each  set  of  steeply  sloped.  Moderately  to  strongly  risk  averse
curves  is  constructed  are  given  in  Table  2  footnotes.  utility  indifference  curves  would  become  tangent
Moments  measured  on  axes  represent  ten-year  sums  at  the  risk  minimizing  corner  solution  but  would
of net margin.  be  less  steeply  sloped  than  the  E-V  curve  at  this
point.  Hence,  in  this  case  the  goal  of  avoiding
SELECTED  MODEL RESULTS market  opportunity  losses  is  inconsistent  with  the
After  an  initial  negatively  sloped  range  that risk  goal  of  maximizing  expected  utility  of  realized  or
averse  decision-makers  would  ignore,  E-V  curve  #1  accounting earnings.
5Values  m,  n, k,  Q employed here were selected to generate  "meaningful"  ranges of expected net margin for each frontier set
and have  no  claim  to  special  importance.  An important  study objective  is  to discover  the sensitivity  of  E-V shape  and range  to
changes in these price  parameters.
6A  random  variable  X with mean  mX  and variance  sX2  has a  coefficient  of  variation  sX/mX.  Coefficient  of variation or its
square,  the relative  variance,  is often used to measure  risk as a proportion  of income level.
20TABLE  2.  E-V  AND COEFFICIENT  OF VARIATION  FRONTIERS  INDICATING  EFFICIENT PORTFOLIOS
OF  MARKET  PRICE,  COST-PLUS  AND  SALES-MINUS  CONTRACTS  FOR  COOPERATIVE
TOMATO PASTE SALES  AND RAW TOMATO  PURCHASES
Moments  and  Coefficients  of  Net  Margin  Tomato  Paste  Sales  c/  Tomato  Purchases  c/
Efficiency  Market  Cost-  Sales-  Market  Cost-  Sales-
set  Standard  Coefficient  price  plus  minus  price  plus  minus  Number  of
no. a/  Mean  b/  Variance  b/  deviation  b/  of  variation  (V 1 )  (V 2)  (V 3)  (R 1)  (R 2)  (R 3)  iterations d/
million  dollars  billion  dollars  million  dollars  proportions  of  proportions  of
portfolio  portfolio
339.620  316,344  17.786  .0524  0  0  1.000  0  0  .250  2
341.330  229,683  15.155  .0444  0  .448  .552  .105  0  .145  16
1  343.049  218,305  14.775  .0431  0  .519  .481  .229  .021  0  16
344.768  228,562  15.118  .0438  .009  .485  .506  .116  .134  0  28
346.000  234,707  15.320  .0443  .064  .439  .497  .045  .205  0  31
349.920  239,022  15.460  .0442  1.000  0  0  0  .250  0  2
301.768  316,468  17.789  .0589  0  0  1.000  0  0  .250  2
312.000  243,655  15.609  .0500  0  .174  .826  .112  0  .138  13
325.480  212,032  14.561  .0447  0  .404  .596  .250  0  0  2
2  337.340  223,015  14.933  .0443  0  .627  .373  .250  0  0  2
349.000  270,347  16.442  .0471  .052  .805  .143  .250  0  0  16
356.000  308,866  17.574  .0494  .300  .668  .032  0  .250  0  14
361.000  343,139  18.524  .0513  0  1.000  0  0  .250  0  2
288.50  340,239  18.445  .0639  .623  .081  .296  0  0  .250  14
289.60  345,230  18.580  .0642  .635  .073  .292  0  0  .250  14
3  293.80  397,480  19.937  .0678  .764  0  .236  0  .050  .200  13
295.00  411,834  20.294  .0687  .804  0  .196  0  .084  .166  13
298.00  450,621  21.228  .0712  .904  0  .096  0  .167  .083  13
302.80  549,712  23.446  .0774  1.000  0  0  .166  0  .084  2
aFor  set  #1,  m  =  1.63,  n  =  .25,  k  =  1.25,  Q =  .08; paste contracts  are signed  on an acreage  basis  and  sales-minus  purchase
options  provide  a  share  of total  cooperative  revenue.  Set #2  differs only in  that m  =  1.70, n  = .22.  In  set #3,  m  = 1.30,  n  = .22,  k
=  1.30,  Q = .40;  paste  contracts  are signed  on  a  tonnage  basis and  sales-minus  purchase options provide a  share  of contract paste
revenue  only.  In  set #3  only, V 2 +  V 3 <.40.
bThe  mean, variance and standard deviation shown here  refer to sum of profits over the 10-year planning horizon.
CValues  listed under V1, V2, V3 are percentages  of 53,559.31  tons (or 12,680 acre-equivalents)  of tomato paste contracted
for  sale.  Values  listed  under  R1,  R2 ,  R3 are  percentages  of  12,680  acres  of  raw  tomatoes  contracted  for  purchase  from
nonmembers.  (Nonmember purchases are  25% of total.)
dThese  are the  iterations  (number  of linear  subprogramming  problems)  required  to reach  a  minimum-variance  portfolio  at
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22OBSERVATIONS  AND CONCLUSIONS  returns  function.  It  is  usual  for  portfolio  studies  to
examine  a  set of business  activities  in  isolation  from
One  E-V  analysis  drawback  is  that  decision-  the decision maker's total profit and loss picture. This
makers  have  no  way  to  select  a portfolio they can be  practice  would  involve  significant  inaccuracy  in  the
sure  will  maximize  expected  utility.  The  best  a firm  present  contracting  problem  since  satisfaction  from
can  do  is  apply  a  rule  of  thumb  that  is  intuitively  purchase  and  sales  activities  are  not  independent.
meaningful  and  associated  with  acceptable  past  Furthermore,  alternative  contract  possibilities  should
experiences.  However,  variances  have  low  intuitive  not  be  evaluated  apart  from  noncontract  revenue  or
value  because  they  are  expressed  in  different  units  variable  costs  since  covariances  between contract and
than  means  and  are  generally  extraordinarily  large.  A  noncontract  activities,  and  the  level  of  noncontract
more  meaningful  measurement  is  the  coefficient  of  business  itself,  affect  desirability  of  contract  port-
variation  curve  which  reflects  changes  in  relative risk  folios.
as  net  margin  expectation  increases.  Useful  rules  of  Further  work  should  be  devoted  to  structuring
thumb  might limit  relative  risk or  its  positive  rate  of  methods  whereby  decision-makers  can  conveniently
change.  Selection  rules  relating  to  coefficients  of  combine  historical  information  with prognostications
variation  may  be  entirely  inconsistent  with  those  of  future  conditions  to  arrive  at  reliable  prediction
relating  to variances.  In efficiency  sets #1 and #2, for  probability  distributions.  Historical  probabilities
example,  portions  of  rising  variance  are  associated  alone  are  inadequate  guides  to  decisions  commiting
with  declining relative  risk.  oneself  to  future  uncertainties.  E-V  results  not
An  important  result  of  the  E-V  studies,  for  reported  here  were  highly  sensitive  to  changes  in
distributor  and  grower as  well  as  cooperative,  is that  employed  probability  distributions.  In  contrast,
apparently  minor  changes  in  contract  formulae  can  Porter  and  Gaumnitz  [6]  have  shown  that E-V  and
have  significant  impact  on  the  content  of  efficient  stochastic  dominance  tests produce  similar results  in
portfolios  and  their  promised  returns  and  risk.  An  all but the minimum  variance  region.  Hence,  emphasis
efficiency  curve  analysis  would  therefore  be  a  valu-  on  probability  formulation  should  have  greater
able  guide  to  firms  engaged  in  planning  and  nego-  impact on accuracy of long-term  decisions than  use of
tiating  contract  terms.  Special  care must  be taken  in  theoretically  more  powerful  but  less  programmable
this  regard  to  design  a  complete  and  accurate  net  stochastic  dominance.
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